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This analysis explores the effective connectivity of the cerebellum with the cerebral cortex during the generation
of correct sequences of social and non-social events, using dynamic causal modelling (DCM). Our hypothesis is
that during human evolution, the cerebellum’s function evolved from a mere coordinator of fluent sequences of
motions and actions, to an interpreter of action sequences without overt movements that are important for social
understanding. This requires efficient neural communication between the cerebellum and cerebral cortex. In a
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, participants generated the correct chronological order of
(non-)social events, including stories involving mechanical and social scripts, and true or false beliefs. Across all
stories, a DCM analysis of these data revealed, as predicted, bidirectional (closed-loop) connections linking the
bilateral posterior cerebellum with the bilateral temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) associated with behavior un-
derstanding, and this connectivity pattern was almost entirely significant. There was also a unidirectional
connection from the right posterior cerebellum to the precuneus, but no direct connections with the dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex (dmPFC). Moreover, all connections emanating from the bilateral posterior cerebellum were
negative, indicative of some kind of error signal. Within the cerebral cortex, there were unidirectional connections
from the bilateral TPJ to the dmPFC, as well as bidirectional connections between the precuneus and dmPFC, and
between the bilateral TPJ. These results confirm that the effective connectivity between the posterior cerebellum
and mentalizing areas in the cerebral cortex play a critical role in the understanding and construction of the
correct order of social and non-social action sequences.1. Introduction
Recent research revealed that the cerebellum plays a critical role in
social understanding. In a large-scale meta-analysis of functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies, Van Overwalle et al. (2014)
found robust activation of the cerebellum during social judgments,
including inferences about other persons’ mental states based on their
actions (“mentalizing” or “mind reading”). The cerebellum is also
implicated in a large range of neuropsychiatric and neurodevelopmental
disorders related to social functioning such as autistic spectrum disorders
(ASD), attentional deficit and hyperkinetic disorder (ADHD), depression,
and schizophrenia (Bauman and Kemper, 2005; D’Mello et al., 2015;
Penn, 2006; Wang et al., 2014).
But what is the exact role of the cerebellum in social understanding?gy, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Ple
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and recollection of sequences that underpin skill and acquisition of fluent
motion, which develops slowly with practice and is inaccessible to con-
sciousness (Braitenberg et al., 1997; Leggio and Molinari, 2015; Pisotta
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models of motor processes involving automatic sequencing and planning
of movement, and the anticipated external perceptions and somatosen-
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during their execution instead of only after failure of execution, which
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developed which allowed the cerebellum to construct internal models of
purely mental processes in which event sequences play a role, without
overt movements and somatosensory feedback. Thus, the cerebellum
generates internal models of all temporally or spatially structured events
that can be used to make predictions about any type of event, including
social event sequences which are the focus of this study. Evidence sug-
gests that, generally, more recently developed higher-level processes
including social cognition involve the posterior cerebellum, while
ancient motor processes involve the anterior cerebellum (Buckner et al.,
2011; Van Overwalle et al., 2014).
Unfortunately, clinical studies with cerebellar patients that addressed
dysfunctions of social cognition often did not focus on the sequencing of
actions, and reported mixed findings in comparison with healthy con-
trols. To illustrate, Sokolovsky et al. (2010) reported impairments in
some but not all cerebellar patients, while Roca et al. (2013) found no
significant differences in mentalizing (Faux Pas test; Baron-Cohen et al.,
1999). Hoche et al. (2016) found worse performance on the Reading the
Mind in the Eyes test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).
Studies investigating social action sequencing found stronger and
more robust impairments of cerebellar patients than healthy matched
controls. In a first study, Leggio et al. (2008) found that cerebellar pa-
tients performed worse on cartoon-like drawings and verbal sentences
which had to be reproduced in a chronologically correct sequence. Using
a very similar task with action photos (Cattaneo et al., 2012), reported
that cerebellar patients performed significantly worse, especially on
photos of biological action and less so on mechanical movements. These
two studies clearly point to the potential diagnostic value of action
sequencing. However, they did not involve inferences on others’ beliefs,
so that the implications on social mentalizing are unclear.
To explore action sequence generation during mentalizing, Van
Overwalle and colleagues (Van Overwalle et al., 2019) used a Picture
Sequencing task with cartoon-like drawings developed by Langdon and
Coltheart (1999; see Fig. 1). This task involves stories in which another
person holds a false belief. False beliefs are a crucial test of the capacity to
mentalize, because they require the understanding that another person
may hold mental beliefs that are contradicted by reality and our own
beliefs. For instance, another personmay hold a false belief on an object’s
current location as a result of the object’s displacement during the per-
son’s earlier absence, and thus may look for the object in the wrong
location (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Wimmer and Perner, 1983). Conse-
quently, participants have to infer the agent’s false belief in order to
understand the agent’s behavior. The results of this study showed strong
impairments of cerebellar patients compared to healthy controls on false
belief story sequences which involved novel (i.e., non-routine) action
sequences, and normal performance on social and non-social routineFig. 1. An example of a false belief (top) and true belief (bottom) sequence in the
Heleven et al., 2019; the correct order is 2–1–4–3). Participants had to select, in th
selection, the pictures moved in the order indicated by the participant.
2
actions (i.e., social scripts and mechanical sequences; Van Overwalle, De
Coninck et al., 2018).
Based on these results, Heleven et al. (2019) extended the Picture
Sequencing task with a true belief condition, which involved very similar
social story elements as the false belief condition, but without false
mental content. Moreover, they also developed a Verbal Sequencing task,
containing the same four conditions of mechanical events, social scripts,
true and false beliefs. When healthy participants executed these two tasks
under the fMRI scanner, all experimental conditions in which sequential
orders were generated, recruited several areas of the cerebellum
compared to a non-sequential control condition measuring reading
comprehension. More importantly, the true and false belief conditions
activated the bilateral posterior cerebellum more strongly than the (non)
social routine conditions (social scripts and mechanical stories). These
results demonstrate that ordering correct action sequences, especially for
novel actions involving true and false beliefs, depends on the activation
of the posterior cerebellum (i.e., Crus 1 and 2) in comparison with
overlearned social and non-social sequences.
Further support for the role of the posterior cerebellum in action
sequencing during social mentalizing can be amassed if we can demon-
strate that this cerebellar lobule is activated in neural synchrony with
mentalizing cortical areas, especially during (true and false) belief action
sequences. Such synchrony has been revealed in earlier research. Based
on resting-state connectivity, Buckner et al. (2011) identified a distinct
mentalizing network in the posterior cerebellum that was directly con-
nected to the mentalizing network in the cerebrum (Molenberghs et al.,
2016; Schurz et al., 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009). Of more importance,
during social mentalizing, the posterior cerebellum is strongly connected
to the mentalizing cerebral cortex as demonstrated by a recent meta--
analytic connectivity analysis on social cognition (Van Overwalle, D’aes,&
Mari€en, 2015) and a dynamic causal modelling (DCM) analysis of effective
connectivity across 5 fMRI studies involving inferences on other person’s
traits and one’s past (Van Overwalle, Van de Steen and Mari€en, 2019).
Dynamic causal modelling (DCM; Friston et al., 2003; Stephan et al.,
2010) is used in the present analysis, and is of particular interest because
it overcomes limitations of alternative approaches such as
psycho-physiological interaction (PPI; Friston et al., 1997). First, a DCM
approach estimates and tests the two directions of connectivity sepa-
rately (from one area to the other and vice versa) so that it is possible to
make a causal interpretation of neural processing loops. Second, DCM
allows to specify “fixed” or “endogenous” connectivity unmodulated by
the experimental manipulation, as well as “modulatory” connectivity
regulated by the experimental conditions. Third, DCM allows to estimate
and test all connections at once in a single model, so that “indirect”
connections via other areas (which may create “false” connectivity) are
better controlled for. Evidently, this is only the case when all relevantPicture Sequencing task (respectively from Langdon and Coltheart, 1999, and
e correct order, the first picture, then the second picture, and so on. After each
F. Van Overwalle et al. NeuroImage 206 (2020) 116326task-activated areas are included in the model.
Given these powerful analytical features, DCM analysis provides a
more biologically plausible test of connectivity, and condition-related
changes in connectivity. So far, anatomical studies indicate that the
majority of cerebro-cerebellar connections are characterized by closed-
loop circuits, where an area of the cerebrum projects to an area of the
cerebellum, and receives input from that same cerebellar area. This is
strong evidence for internal forward cerebellar models that communicate
with the cerebrum. Anatomical studies on animals found mainly
contralateral closed-loop circuits (Kelly and Strick, 2003), while some
studies revealed the existence of additional ipsilateral loops in rats
(Suzuki et al., 2012) and humans (Cui et al., 2000; Salmi et al., 2010;
Sokolov et al., 2014). In support of this anatomical evidence, a human
resting-state connectivity analysis by Krienen and Buckner (2009)
revealed that the connections from the cerebral cortex terminate on
contralateral areas of the cerebellum in 70–80%, and on ipsilateral areas
in 20–30%. In line with this evidence, the DCM analysis on five men-
talizing studies mentioned earlier (Van Overwalle, Van de Steen and
Mari€en, 2019) found closed-loops between the right posterior cerebellum
and the bilateral TPJ, and only a unidirectional link from the right pos-
terior cerebellum to the precuneus.
The aim of the present study is to investigate the effective connec-
tivity between mentalizing areas of the cerebrum and the cerebellum, by
applying a biologically plausible DCM analysis on the fMRI study on
(non)social pictorial sequencing by Heleven et al. (2019). By doing this,
we can shed more light on the specific processes that take place in the
posterior cerebellum, in particular, processes involving chronological
sequencing of social and non-social actions. This would support the
general hypothesis that the cerebellum is involved in sequencing in
concert with the cerebrum, also in the domain of social mentalizing.
In particular, we expect to replicate and extend many findings of the
earlier multi-study DCM analysis by Van Overwalle, Van de Steen and
Mari€en (2019). We expect to replicate the contralateral and ipsilateral
closed-loops between the right posterior cerebellum and cerebrum, and
extend it to the left posterior cerebellum because this area was also
activated in the fMRI study by Heleven et al. (2019). We also expect to
replicate the closed-loops with cerebral mentalizing areas of the bilateral
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), and the lack of closed-loops with the
precuneus or dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC). Moreover, we
expect to replicate the finding that connections originating from the
cerebellum reflect a (negative) error signal that is used by the cerebral
cortex to adjust its activation in the opposite direction. Finally, the DCM
analysis will allow us to see whether and which connections between the
cerebrum and cerebellum are modulated during mentalizing beliefs as
opposed to (non)social routine events as suggested by the study of Hel-
even et al. (2019).
2. Method
2.1. Participants
As described in Heleven et al. (2019), there were 49 participants (24
men) conducting the Picture Sequencing task. All participants were right
handed, native Dutch speaking with no neurological or psychiatric an-
tecedents, and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Informed
consent was obtained in a manner approved by the Medical Ethics
Committee at the Hospital of University of Ghent, where the studies was
conducted. Participants were paid 20 euro in exchange for their
participation.
2.2. Stimulus material and procedure
Participants saw 16 scenarios that represented 4 mechanical, 4 social
script, and 4 false belief events from the original task developed by
Langdon and Coltheart (1999; for an example see Fig. 1), and 4 true belief
events developed by Heleven et al. (2019). As a control condition, there3
was a non-sequential reading comprehension task. All stimuli are avail-
able upon request.
The experiment under the scanner started with the control trials,
followed by the experimental trials in a random order. Before the start of
the control and experimental conditions, instructions were shown on the
screen, then practice trials, and finally the actual trials. Each trial started
with a fixation cross (1 s), followed by the presentation of 4 pictures in a
correct chronological order (control trials) or random order (experi-
mental trials). At the end of each trial, for the control condition, partic-
ipants read a factual question and gave a self-paced response. For the
experimental trials, participants had to line up the pictures in the correct
order at a self-paced tempo. This was done by first selecting the first
picture on the screen, then the second picture, and so on, while the
pictures moved on the screen along the order indicated.
2.3. fMRI processing and statistical analysis
Images were collected with a 3 T S Magnetom Prisma fit scanner
system (Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany) using a 64-chan-
nel radiofrequency head coil. Stimuli were projected onto a screen at the
end of the magnet bore that participants viewed by way of a mirror
mounted on the head coil. Stimulus presentation was controlled by E-
Prime 2.0 (www.pstnet.com/eprime; Psychology Software Tools)
running under Windows XP. Participants were placed head first and su-
pine in the scanner bore and were instructed not to move their heads to
avoid motion artifacts. Foam cushions were placed within the head coil
to minimize head movements. First, a high-resolution anatomical images
were acquired using a T1-weighted 3D MPRAGE sequence
[TR¼ 2250m s, TE¼ 4.18m s, TI¼ 900m s, acquisition ma-
trix¼ 256 256 176, sagittal FOV¼ 256mm, flip angle¼ 9, voxel
size¼ 1 1 1mm]. Second, a fieldmap was calculated to correct for
inhomogeneities in the magnetic field (Cusack and Papadakis, 2002).
Next, whole brain functional images were collected in a single run using a
T2*-weighted gradient echo sequence, sensitive to BOLD contrast (TR ¼
2000 m s, TE ¼ 29 m s, image matrix ¼ 64  64, FOV ¼ 224 mm, flip
angle ¼ 90, slice thickness ¼ 4.0 mm, distance factor ¼ 10%, voxel size
¼ 3.5  3.5  4.0 mm, 35 axial slices, acceleration factor GRAPPA ¼ 2).
To process the fMRI data, SPM12 was used (Wellcome Department of
Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). To remove sources of noise and
artifact, data were preprocessed. Inhomogeneities in the magnetic field
were corrected using the fieldmap (Cusack and Papadakis, 2002).
Functional data were corrected for differences in acquisition time be-
tween slices for each whole-brain volume, realigned to correct for head
movement, and co-registered with each participant’s anatomical data.
Then, the functional data were transformed into a standard anatomical
space (2mm isotropic voxels) based on the ICBM152 brain template of
the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI). Normalized data were then
spatially smoothed (6mm full-width at half-maximum, FWHM) using a
Gaussian Kernel. Finally, using the Artifact Detection Tool software
package (ART; http://web.mit.edu/swg/art/art.pdf; http://www.nitrc
.org/projects/artifact_detect), the preprocessed data were examined for
excessive motion artifacts and for correlations between motion and
experimental design, and between global mean signal and experimental
design. Outliers were identified in the temporal differences series by
assessing between-scan differences (Z-threshold: 3.0 mm, scan to scan
movement threshold: 0.5mm; rotation threshold: 0.02 radians). These
outliers were omitted from the analysis by including a single regressor for
each outlier. Six directions of motion parameters from the realignment
step as well as outlier time points (defined by ART) were included as
nuisance regressors. A default high-pass filter was used of 128s and serial
correlations were accounted for by the default auto-regressive AR(1)
model.
To conduct the statistical analyses of the fMRI data, the general linear
model approach of SPM12 was used (Wellcome Department of Cognitive
Neurology, London, UK). At the first (single participant) level, the event-
related design was modeled for each condition time-locked at the
F. Van Overwalle et al. NeuroImage 206 (2020) 116326presentation of the first picture, and convolved with a canonical hemo-
dynamic response function with time and dispersion derivatives. Event
duration was set to 4 s for all conditions. Given that the beginning period
of each trial was most essential, all correct and incorrect trials were
included. At the second (group) level, a whole-brain random effects
analysis was performed using a within-participants one-way analysis of
variance, contrasting each experimental condition with the non-
sequential control condition, as well as contrasting all experimental
conditions with each other. In addition, a conjunction of the contrasts of
all experimental conditions against the control condition was performed.
2.4. Selection of regions of interest
We took the same region of interest (ROI) a priori coordinates and
procedure used in the earlier DCM study (Van Overwalle et al., 2018).
Specifically, the cortical mentalizing ROIs were centered around the
mean MNI coordinates reported in the meta-analyses by Van Overwalle,
2009 and Van Overwalle and Baetens (2009) and included the dmPFC
(with MNI center: 0 50 35), bilateral TPJ (50–55 25) and pre-
cuneus/posterior cingulate (Pcun: 0–60 40). The cerebellar ROI was
identified by Van Overwalle and Mari€en (2016) and involved lobule VIIa
- Crus 2 in the right posterior cerebellum (rpCB: 25–75 -40).
In order to explore whether there were additional cerebral areas that
were robustly activated under all experimental sequencing conditions,
and to rely on a broader database that would be somewhat more inde-
pendent, we searched for exploratory ROIs not only in the original data of
the Picture Sequencing task, but also in a similar Story Sequencing task
reported in the same article (Heleven et al., 2019), and conducted a
between-participant analysis on all data. Specifically, we conducted the
same second level whole-brain statistical analysis as in the original fMRI
study (Heleven et al., 2019) using the conjunction of the contrasts of all
experimental conditions against the control condition. This analysis
revealed, apart from the mentalizing clusters covered by the a priori ROIs
above, additional clusters in the cerebellum, the bilateral hippocampus
and the bilateral insula. (The DCM results on the Story task are not re-
ported because the DCM estimation failed to converge for 7 participants,
leaving only 17 valid participants, even after doubling the default
maximum number of iterations).
To identify additional cerebellar ROIs, clusters were considered sig-
nificant at a Family Wise Error (FWE) corrected peak threshold p< .05,
with a minimum cluster extent of 10 voxels. This analysis revealed
cerebellar clusters withMNI peak coordinates -42 -72 -40, 24–54 -50, and
22–50 -22 (which were very close to the original coordinates of the
Picture Sequence study: 40 -78 -40, 22–58 -48, and 24–52 -24). These
peak coordinates were rounded to the next 5mm to serve as center for
additional exploratory cerebellar ROIs: a left posterior cerebellar ROI
(lpCB: 40 -70 -40) which was located somewhat more peripherally than
the rpCB and served as left counterpart, and two more anterior cerebellar
ROIs including the right lobule VIII (rCBVIII: 25–55 -50) and right lobule
IV-V (rCBIV-V: 20–50 -20). This addition results in eight ROIs in total.
Using the same procedure, we also specified for secondary DCM an-
alyses, two subcortical ROIs in the bilateral hippocampus (25–40 5)
and two cortical ROIs in the bilateral insula (50 5 5).
Individually-tailored cerebral ROIs were created by extracting the
time-series using the eigenvariate within a sphere with a radius of 8mm
around the nearest local maximum within 15mm of the corresponding
ROI centers listed above, after setting a whole-brain threshold of the
contrast at p< .05 (uncorrected). All voxels contributing to the ROI were
conducted on an F-contrast involving all contrasts of the experimental
conditions against the control condition, and adjusted using an F-contrast
involving all experimental effects. Individually-tailored cerebellar and
subcortical ROIs were created in a similar manner, except that the radius
was confined to 5mm around the nearest local maximum within 10mm
of the corresponding ROI center, given the smaller size of the cerebellum
and subcortical areas. If the ROI did not contain a peak surviving the
p< .05 uncorrected threshold, the same procedure was repeated with4
p< .10 and p< 1.00 (uncorrected) so that time series of all ROIs were
included for all participants (see Table 1 for details). In the latter case of
p< 1.00, ROIs were centered around the group-based centers listed
above (see also Zhou et al., 2007). This procedure was used because
pairwise exclusion is not possible in a DCM analysis as all time-series
from all ROIs are required. Setting a more tolerant threshold in some
individual cases implies an optimal compromise betweenmaximizing the
effect of interest at the individual level while having all participants in
the DCM analysis so that the results are not biased by excluding some
participants (Zhou et al., 2007).
2.5. Dynamic causal modelling
We used exactly the same procedure as in the earlier DCM analysis
(Van Overwalle et al., 2018). Specifically, we followed the procedures
described in Friston et al. (2016) and Friston et al. (2015), and detailed in
https://en.wikibooks.org/wiki/User:Peterz/sandbox:
First, a full DCM was specified and estimated for each participant
using SPM12 (cf., SPM procedure: spm_dcm_fit). A full model allows all
connectivity parameters in all directions to be freely estimated. We
specified a bilinear deterministic DCM without centering around the
mean (Friston et al., 2003), which included (a) all forward and backward
fixed connections between the ROIs, (b) all the modulatory connections or
parameters that reflect condition changes due to each experimental
condition and (c) direct input parameters that reflect the input driving the
activity in the ROIs in all experimental and control conditions. Stated
differently, the driving input in matrix C consists of one vector with all
the onsets of all experimental and control conditions combined as one
input, and the modularity connections in Matrix B are specified only for
the experimental conditions, so that both matrix inputs are
non-redundant to each other (Hillebrandt et al., 2015).
Second, we constructed a Parametric Empirical Bayes (PEB) model for
the whole group of participants over all parameters (cf., SPM procedure:
spm_dcm_peb). This makes it possible to estimate the effective connec-
tivity averaged across all participants (cf., group average), taking into
account the within-participants variability on the connectivity parame-
ters, unlike a classical test (e.g. t-test) which ignores the estimated un-
certainty (variance) about the connection strengths.
Third, we automatically pruned away any connectivity parameter
from the group-level PEB which did not contribute to the model evidence
using Bayesian model reduction (cf. SPM procedure: spm_dcm_peb_bmc).
This approach has the advantage that any reduced model at the group
level can be estimated efficiently without having to re-estimate the
reduced models at the lower level (single-participant levels) and is
therefore recommended (Friston et al., 2015). Specifically, a greedy
search iteratively prunes connection parameters from the full model until
model-evidence starts to decrease, so that the most relevant nested
models from the full PEB model are tested (a greedy search is recom-
mended because the model space of all possible nested models is too
large to be fully evaluated). Bayesian model averaging of the parameters
of the best 256 pruned models is applied and used for group-inferences
(Zhou et al., 2018, p. 707, 2.7.4), and so determines the winning
model empirically. We considered connectivity parameters as significant
when their posterior probability p> .95 (based on model comparisons
with and without each parameter). This Bayesian approach both for
first-level connectivity analysis (DCM) as well as group-level inference
(PEB) on connectivity parameters eschews the multiple comparisons
problem (Friston et al., 2003, p. 1276, 1.3).
3. Results
Tables 2 and 3 show the fixed and modulatory estimates respectively
of the connectivity between cerebellar and cerebral mentalizing ROIs of
the reduced model (after pruning). The estimates in the off-diagonal cells
correspond to rate constants and are expressed in units of 1/s (Hz), or the
amount by which activation in the source ROI changes the activation in
Table 1
Total number of participants (n) and number of participants with ROIs at reduced thresholds.
rpCE lpCE rCEVIII rCEIV-V Pcun lTPJ rTPJ dmPFC
n <.10 <1 <.10 <1 <.10 <1 <.10 <1 <.10 <1 <.10 <1 <.10 <1 <.10 <1
49 1 1 4 2 2 2 – – – – – – – – – –
Table 2
Averaged fixed connections in units of 1/s (Hz).
to \ from rpCB lpCB rCBVIII rCBIV-V Pcun lTPJ rTPJ dmPFC
rpCB 0.63* 0.00 0.12* 0.06* 0.00 0.07* 0.08* 0.01
lpCB 0 0.73* 0.10* 0 0.07* 0.04* 0.05* 0.01
rCBVIII 0.03 0 0.64* 0.03 0.01 0 0.04* 0.05*
rCBIV-V 0.04* 0 0.09* 0.66* 0.03 0 0.10* 0.01
Pcun 0.06* 0 0.17* 0.16* 0.67* 0.11* 0.10* 0.10*
lTPJ 0.07* 0.03 0 0 0 0.79* 0.10* 0.01
rTPJ 0.09* 0.09* 0 0 0.05* 0.15* 0.85* 0
dmPFC 0 0 0 0.06* 0.10* 0.12* 0.05* 0.78*
Note: Cell entries refer to connections with * denoting posterior probability p> .95. l¼ left, r¼ right, p¼ posterior, CB¼ cerebellum, PCun¼ precuneus, TPJ¼ tem-
poro-parietal junction, dmPFC¼ dorsomedial prefrontal cortex.
Table 3
Averaged modulatory connections in units of 1/s (Hz).
to \ from rpCB lpCB rCBVIII rCBIV-V Pcun lTPJ rTPJ dmPFC
Modulatory connectivity of Mechanical Scripts
rpCB 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01
lpCB 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02
rCBVIII 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04
rCBIV-V 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02
Pcun 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.59* 0.00 0.30* 0.39*
lTPJ 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.01
rTPJ 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.01
dmPFC 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.28* 0.02 0.02 0.01
Modulatory connectivity of Social Scripts
rpCB 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
lpCB 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.04
rCBVIII 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.05
rCBIV-V 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
Pcun 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.47* 0.02 0.30* 0.06
lTPJ 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.58* 0.04 0.00
rTPJ 0.03 0.00 0.44* 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.01
dmPFC 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.28* 0.02 0.00 0.03
Modulatory connectivity of False beliefs
rpCB 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
lpCB 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01
rCBVIII 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.03
rCBIV-V 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
Pcun 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.45* 0.01 0.02 0.31*
lTPJ 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.51* 0.02 0.02
rTPJ 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02
dmPFC 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.31* 0.02 0.00 0.03
Modulatory connectivity of True Beliefs
rpCB 0.52* 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.00
lpCB 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.00
rCBVIII 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03
rCBIV-V 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.00
Pcun 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.49* 0.03 0.17 0.04
lTPJ 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.41* 0.00 0.46* 0.01 0.00
rTPJ 0.03 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03
dmPFC 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.31* 0.02 0.02 0.03
Note: Cell entries refer to connections with * denoting posterior probability p> .95. l¼ left, r¼ right, p¼ posterior, CB¼ cerebellum, PCun¼ precuneus, TPJ¼ tem-
poro-parietal junction, dmPFC¼ dorsomedial prefrontal cortex.
F. Van Overwalle et al. NeuroImage 206 (2020) 116326the target ROI per unit of second. The estimates in the diagonal cells,
which are of less interest, express inhibition by self-connections in the
format of a log scale. Negative values of the log scale indicate a scaling
factor between 0 and 1, or weak self-inhibition, while positive values
indicate a Hertz above 1, or strong self-inhibition. During Bayesian
inversion, the scaling factor is multiplied with a fixed negative self-
connection of 0.5 Hz so that in effect the self-connections are always5
inhibitory in nature.
We predicted contralateral and ipsilateral bidirectional connections
(i.e., closed-loops) between the posterior cerebellar ROIs with key
mentalizing cerebral areas, most likely the bilateral TPJ. Moreover, we
predicted that connections originating from the cerebellum would reflect
some sort of negative error signal.
Consistent with these predictions, we found significant closed-loops
F. Van Overwalle et al. NeuroImage 206 (2020) 116326between the bilateral posterior cerebellum with the bilateral TPJ, except
for a unidirectional connection from the left TPJ to the left posterior
cerebellum which was part of the reduced model, but did not reach
significance (Table 2 & Fig. 2). In addition, there was a unidirectional
connection from the cerebellum to the precuneus, but no reverse link.
There were no cerebral connections with the dmPFC. Also consistent
with our prediction is that the cerebellum sends out a negative error
signal, while all connections going toward the cerebellum were positive.
We also explored the possibility of closed-loops with the two exploratory,
more anterior cerebellar ROIs (rCBIV-V and rCBVIII), and found signifi-
cant links with the precuneus, TPJ and dmPFC, but all of these were
unidirectional: Significant connections were revealed from the right TPJ
and dmPFC to one or both exploratory cerebellar ROIs, and reverse
connections from one or both exploratory cerebellar ROIs to the pre-
cuneus and dmPFC. Finally, there was no modulation of the cerebral
connections with the posterior cerebellar ROIs, and there were only two
modulations with the exploratory cerebellar ROIs (Table 3).
The connections within the cerebral cortex were largely as one might
expect (Table 2 & Fig. 2). There were bidirectional connections between
the left and right TPJ, and unidirectional connections from the precuneus
and bilateral TPJ to the dmPFC, but almost no reverse connections from
the dmPFC except to the precuneus. There were also bidirectional con-
nections from the bilateral TPJ to the precuneus, except from the pre-
cuneus to the left TPJ. Finally, modulation of connectivity between the
mentalizing ROIs was very rare and involved downregulating as well as
upregulating a limited number of connections (Table 3).
In addition, none of the driving inputs to the ROIs reached
significance.
We also explored the potential role of the hippocampus and insula inFig. 2. Direct connections between key left and right (l/r) areas including the
posterior cerebellum (pCE), precuneus (Pc), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) and
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) retained in the reduced model. All
connections have posterior p> .95, except for the link from left TPJ to left pCE
with p¼ .62. The connectivity estimates correspond to rate constants and are
expressed in units of 1/s (Hz). To avoid cluttering the figure, the estimates are
summarized on the left and right side of the figure (with a red double arrow
indicating all directions), and only estimates outside these ranges are indicated
at specific connections. The white area in the cerebellum refers to the mental-
izing network identified by Buckner et al. (2011).
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cortico-cerebellar connectivity, because these ROIs were also strongly
activated in the original study (Heleven et al., 2019). This was done by
exploring two alternative models in which either the bilateral hippo-
campus ROIs, or the bilateral insula ROIs replaced the two anterior
cerebellar ROIs of less interest (as the number of ROIs in DCM is tech-
nically limited to 8 by default). The results, did not reveal any connec-
tions between the posterior cerebellar ROIs and the bilateral insula.
However, there was one significant connection (among all cortical ROIs)
from the right TPJ to the right hippocampus (0.04), and from the right
(and left) hippocampus to the right posterior cerebellum (0.12 & 0.08
respectively), but no reverse links from or between the hippocampal
ROIs. Note that this indirect connection emits at the end a negative signal
to the cerebellum (0.04 x 0.12), which contradicts the positive direct
connection from the TPJ to the right posterior cerebellum (0.08; Table 2).
4. Discussion
This study investigated whether cerebellar areas involved in the
generation of action sequences, are activated in synchrony with social
mentalizing areas located in the cerebral cortex by using DCM. We used
recent fMRI data on social action sequencing (Heleven et al., 2019)
which revealed robust cerebellar ROIs, and we expected to confirm and
extend the evidence for closed-loop circuits as demonstrated by a recent
DCM connectivity analysis (Van Overwalle et al., 2018). This evidence
would further support the hypothesis that internal forward models in the
cerebellum communicate with cerebral cortical areas and are responsible
for the formation and predictions involving action sequencing.
As explained in the introduction, DCM has many strong features. First
and perhaps most importantly, DCM allows to specify the directionality
of the connections so that we can verify the existence of closed-loops.
Second, it also allows to distinguish between (a) connections that are
fixed and independent from experimental manipulation, and (b) the
modulation of the experimental conditions on these connections. Third,
DCM identifies only direct connections by controlling for indirect effects
via other connections specified in the model. In this respect, DCM allows
a much more accurate insight on the flow of neural propagation of ac-
tivity between cerebrum and cerebellum.
After pruning away connections that were not contributing to the
model evidence, the analysis offered a group-level model of effective
connectivity, or dynamic causal model, that provided the best fit with the
data (see Table 2 and Fig. 2). This model identified closed-loops between
the bilateral posterior cerebellar lobes and the bilateral TPJ, a key area of
the mentalizing network (except for one connection from the left pos-
terior cerebellum to the left TPJ which was part of the final model so that
it should not be ignored, but its strength by itself was not significant).
There were no closed-loops with other mentalizing areas in the cortex,
such as the precuneus and the mPFC. Moreover, all connections origi-
nating from the posterior cerebellum were negative while the reverse
connections to the posterior cerebellum were positive, which raises the
speculation that the cerebellum emits a kind of error signal that is
different from the signal it receives from the cerebrum. Considering the
lack of differentiation between social and non-social events in connec-
tivity, this observation does not involve uniquely social sequencing, but
all types of sequences in general. However, the present data do not allow
to say whether the negative connections from the posterior cerebellum
extend to the whole cerebellum. Together, the data confirm and extend
the earlier evidence of closed-loop circuits between the cerebellum and
cerebrum during social reasoning from an earlier DCM analysis, which
also revealed positive connections from the TPJ to the cerebellum, and
negative connections in the reverse direction (Van Overwalle et al.,
2018).
The closed-loops between the bilateral posterior cerebellum and the
bilateral TPJ support the role of the TPJ in understanding actions and
events provided in the study by Heleven et al. (2019). This connectivity
pattern indicates that social processes in the mentalizing TPJ trigger
further activity in mentalizing areas of the bilateral posterior cerebellum,
F. Van Overwalle et al. NeuroImage 206 (2020) 116326and vice-versa. This provides support for domain-specific connectivity
circuit between mentalizing areas of the cerebrum and cerebellum.
The connections are also consistent with recent anatomical research
showing predominantly closed-loops from the cerebellum terminating on
contralateral cerebral areas in animals (Kelly and Strick, 2003; Suzuki
et al., 2012) and humans, although a minority of functional connections
in humans terminate also on ipsilateral cerebral areas (Krienen and
Buckner, 2009; Salmi et al., 2010; Sokolov et al., 2014). The present
finding of ipsilateral connections to the human cerebral cortex with quite
significant functional influence, requires further research. Of interest is
that research with humans reported ipsilateral connections mainly in
posterior mentalizing cerebellar areas, including Crus 1, during the
perception of humanmovements (Sokolov et al., 2014) or humanmusical
sounds (Salmi et al., 2010). Future research might explore whether the
presence of significant ipsilateral TPJ connectivity with the bilateral
posterior cerebellum is accidental or systematic, and what these ipsilat-
eral links might imply for the functionality of the cerebellum in social
cognition.
We tested for relay stations in the connectivity between the cere-
bellum and cortex, and found no connectivity at all with the insula, but
some evidence for an indirect ipsilateral TPJ → hippocampus → cere-
bellum link on the right hemisphere, but no reverse indirect link.
Moreover, the total signal of this indirect right TPJ link was negative,
contradicting the positive direct signal from the right TPJ. Together,
these findings provide only weak evidence for intermediate relay sta-
tions, which seems to contradict the general notion that closed-loops
connect the cerebellum to the cortex through multi-synaptic pathways
(Kelley and Strick, 2003). Several methodological factors in the original
study (Heleven et al., 2019) might have contributed to this, including a
control condition which was insufficient to reach significant contrast
activation in classic motor-related relay stations such as the basal ganglia.
Note, however, that this area did not show activation either in the earlier
DCM analysis on mentalizing (Van Overwalle, Van de Steen and Mari€en,
2019). Structural neuroimaging data such as diffusion tensor imaging or
tracing studies are needed to make stronger claims on anatomical tracts
along which social mentalizing information might propagate.
Within the cerebrum, the model identified closed-loop connectivity
between the bilateral TPJ, and between the dmPFC and precuneus, but
only unidirectional connections from the bilateral TPJ to the dmPFC.
These findings suggest that there is mainly input from the precuneus and
TPJ to the mPFC, responsible for higher order mentalizing (Baetens et al.,
2013; Baetens et al., 2017). This is in line with data showing faster neural
activity in the TPJ than in the mPFC as revealed by EEG findings (Van der
Cruyssen, Van Duynslaeger, Cortoos and Van Overwalle, 2009; Van
Duynslaeger, Sterken, Van Overwalle and Verstraeten, 2008; Van
Duynslaeger, Van Overwalle and Verstraeten, 2007) and fMRI studies
(Ma et al., 2012). Note that a lack of direct connections between the
posterior cerebellum and the dmPFC, an important area in the mental-
izing network, should not obscure the finding that this area reveals in-
direct bidirectional connections with the posterior cerebellum via the
TPJ and the precuneus.
The identification of close-loop circuits between the cerebellum and
cerebrum, with negative error signals from the cerebellum, is in line with
the cerebellar theory of Ito (2008) and further strengthens the role of the
cerebellum in social cognition. This is consistent with the hypothesis that
the evolutionary older cerebellar function of building forward models for
motor control, recently evolved and extended toward purely mental
control during cognitive operations and social reasoning in which event
sequences play an important role (Ito, 2008; Pisotta and Molinari, 2014).
By building internal cerebellar models of social events, humans can
anticipate action sequences during social interaction and joint action in
an automatic and intuitive way. This role of internal sequence prediction
is perhaps most prominent in mental reconstructions, devoid of direct
observations, in preparation of such interactions. When these internal
anticipations fail on the basis of novel evidence, it is assumed that the
cerebellum makes corrective adjustments while the action is unfolding,7
and fine-tunes existing anticipations to create an improved internal
model (Ito, 2008; Pisotta and Molinari, 2014). Taken together, our
connectivity data provide strong evidence for a circuit in which se-
quences of social actions, extracted in the cerebrum are further propa-
gated to an internal model in the cerebellum, which acts as a forward
controller that sends error signals to improve predictions on the impli-
cated social behavioral sequences to facilitate fluent and automatic social
interaction.
One aspect of this analysis was rather unexpected. The results iden-
tified mainly fixed connections between the cerebrum and cerebellum
with very little modulation by the experimental conditions, thus
revealing little differentiation between social and non-social events,
much like the earlier DCM analysis on social mentalizing (Van Overwalle
et al., 2018). The lack of modulation seems to speak against the view that
the current cerebro-cerebellar connections are specifically related to
belief understanding during social mentalizing in contrast to the other
(non)social routine conditions. This result might seem surprising at first
sight, because it seems to suggest that even purely mechanical sequences
recruit synchronized activation of mentalizing areas in the cerebellum
and cerebral cortex. However, the finding of substantial fixed connec-
tivity may be interpreted differently. It may suggest that varying high and
low levels of activity in both the cerebellum and the cerebrum as
observed across the different experimental conditions (Heleven et al.,
2019), occur in close synchrony regardless of condition, and this provides
even stronger evidence for the close connectivity between these two
brain parts. If true, this interpretation suggests that the same connections
should also be observed during resting state, which is supported by
earlier research (cf. Buckner at al. 2011). In addition, this high level of
synchrony across conditions might perhaps have been increased by the
fact that most experimental conditions contain substantial social ele-
ments (i.e., persons). Moreover, by providing all experimental trials in a
random order, some spontaneous mentalizing processes triggered by the
belief conditions might have leaked to the other conditions as well.
5. Conclusion
The present dynamic modelling analysis supports the recently
acknowledged relation between the cerebellar function of sequence
processing and social mentalizing. It demonstrates that there are domain-
specific mentalizing closed-loops between the cerebrum and the cere-
bellum. This analysis sheds more light on the specific processes that take
place in the posterior cerebellum, in particular, the sequencing of social
actions. This supports the view that the cerebellum is a forward
controller that matches internal cerebellar models of event sequences
against external sources and contexts in the cerebrum. It is a first step
towards broadening our knowledge on cortico-cerebellar connectivity for
other social sequences and processing modes during social mentalizing.
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